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NOTES
CIVIL UABILITY OF PERSONS PARTICIPATING
IN THE DETENTION OF THE ALLEGEDLY
MENTALLY ILL
The theory behind the commitment and care of the mentally ill has
undergone great change during the last century. Mental illness was once
viewed as a shameful weakness or as a punishment for sin. The belief that
mental illness is a disease which, with proper care, can be cured, simply
did not exist. Early commitment statutes reflected this thought, concerning
themselves with the mentally disturbed person only if he constituted a
danger to others.' The law had little interest in the welfare of the lunatic
himself!2 As late as 1824, there were only two hospitals in the United
States which were devoted exclusively to the care of the mentally ill.3 Thus,
the mentally disturbed person was cared for by his family or friends,' or
not at all.
Mental disability is, of course, now recognized as an illness which can
be treated and often cured. Consequently, commitment to a mental in-
stitution is not seen simply as a convenient means of protecting society from
an incurably dangerous "madman"; commitment is considered an oppor-
tunity to provide the patient with rest and treatment which should at least
relieve his immediate symptoms, and which hopefully will lead to his cure.
One expert has described commitment as a means by which the patient
may be returned to the "stream of normal community life."5
To implement this philosophy, a number of liberal commitment statutes,
many based on the Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill,'
I. AmWCAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 9-10
(1961).
2. This is evidenced by a Pennsylvania case in 1676 in which a father complained to
the court that he was too poor to maintain his son, who was "quyt madd." The court
ordered that three or four men be hired "to build a little blockhouse at Amesland for
to put in the said mdman." Id. at 9.
3. Id. at 10.
4. Id. at 9.
5. Stevenson, Introductory Statement to NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH,
FEDZRAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE
MENTALLY ILL (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, rev. ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited
as DRAFT ACT].
6. The Draft Act, a model act, has been used by many states in redrafting their
mental health codes. The Draft Act's general objectives have been stated as follows:
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were adopted to make it easier for the mentally ill to receive treatment.
Taken by themselves, such statutes seem to go far toward insuring the
ready availability of care and treatment for the mentally disabled. How-
ever, those who are expected to use these commitment procedures--police-
men, public health officers, doctors, and members of the patient's family-
may hesitate to do so if they fear damage suits based on a theory of wrong-
ful commitment. If this hesitation does in fact result, liberal commitment
procedures may be rendered ineffective.
In the first place, the law should put no hindrance in the way to the prompt use
of those instrumentalities which are regarded as most effectual in promoting the
comfort and restoration of the patient. Secondly, it should spare all unnecessary
exposure of private troubles, and all unnecessary conflict with popular prejudices.
Thirdly, it should protect individuals from wrongful imprisonment. Foreword to
DRAFT ACT.
The Draft Act provides for several different types of commitment procedures.
Voluntary Hospitalization: The head of a private or public hospital is authorized to
admit, subject to the availability of suitable accomodations, a person who is mentally
ill or has symptoms of mental illness, and who, if sixteen or over, applies for admission.
If the person is under sixteen, his parent or legal guardian may make application. The
voluntary patient must be released when he has recovered, when his further hospitaliza-
tion is no longer advisable, or when release would "contribute to the most effective
use of the hospital in the care and treatment of the mentally ill." The voluntary patient
must be released upon his own request or, if he is under sixteen, upon the request of
his parent or guardian, unless the head of the hospital files within forty-eight hours
a certification that release would be unsafe for the patient or others, thereby initiating
judicial proceedings. DRAFT ACT §§ 2-3.
Involuntary Hospitalization: The Draft Act provides for an emergency procedure
whereby any health or police officer may take an individual into custody and transport
him to a hospital, pending examination and certification by a physician, if he has
reason to believe that the individual, because of his mental illness, is likely to injure
himself or others. DRAFT Act § 8.
The Draft Act also contains two nonjudicial medical certification procedures. The
first provides that an individual may be admitted to a hospital upon application by a
friend, spouse, relative, or guardian, a health or public welfare officer, or the head of
an institution in which the individual is held, and upon certification by two designated
examiners that they have examined the individual and have found that he is mentally
ill and dangerous, or that he is in need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient insight
or capacity to seek treatment himself. DRAFT ACT § 6.
Section 7 of the Act provides for emergency medical certification. Admission is
provided for upon the application of any person stating his belief that the person to be
committed is likely to cause injury to himself or others if not immediately restrained.
This must be accompanied by the certification of at least one licensed physician that
he has examined the individual and has found him to be mentally ill and dangerous.
DRAFT ACT § 7.
A judicial procedure is provided whereby, upon application by a proper personl, ac-
companied by a physician's certificate stating that the individual requires hospitalization,
the court must give notice to the proposed patient (unless there is reason to believe
notice would be harmful) and appoint two examiners to make an examination and
report to the court. If the report indicates a need for hospitalization, a hearing will be
held and notice given to the allegedly insane person. DRAFT ACT § 9.
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This note examines the possible civil liability of those persons participat-
ing in commitment proceedings. It also discusses the extent to which the
law relating to the civil liability of such participants is an effective means
of protecting an individual's right to be free from unwarranted interference
with his personal freedom, and whether this law furthers or hinders the
goal of providing procedures designed to insure that all individuals in
need of mental treatment will receive it.
I. SuMMARY ARREST
A. Private Persons
At common law the courts recognized a privilege to detain an insane
person without the delay of obtaining a warrant or initiating any other
judicial proceeding. However, this privilege of summary arrest could be
exercised by a private person only when an emergency existed-when it
was necessary to prevent injury to the insane individual or others." It was
necessary that dangerous insanity actually exist before the right of summary
arrest could be exercised by a private person. The right to restrain a person
who was dangerously insane existed only so long as the emergency lasted.'
Thus, once the fury subsided or the fit of depression ended, the person
detained had to be released. An attempt to cause a summary arrest in
the absence of dangerous insanity could lead to civil liability in an action
of false imprisonment.
The possibility of liability is enhanced by the fact that in false imprison-
ment the burden of showing the legality of the arrest is on the defendant.9
Thus, the defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff was in
fact insane and that he constituted a danger to himself or others. If he
fails, he is held liable. The fact that the defendant can show that he acted
in good faith, with a reasonable belief that the plaintiff was dangerously
insane, or that he acted with the best interests of the plaintiff in mind, is
immaterial if he cannot prove actual dangerous insanity."
The requirement of dangerous insanity as a condition precedent to
7. Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 39 AtI. 169 (1898) ; Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill.
305, 151 N.E. 911 (1926); Paetz v. Dain, 1 Wils. 148 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1872); Max-
well v. Maxwell, 109 Iowa 7, 177 N.W. 541 (1920); Keleher v. Putnam, 60 N.H. 30,
49 Am. Rep. 304 (1880); Colby v. Jackson, 12 N.H. 526 (1842); Emmerich v. Thorley,
35 App. Div. 452, 54 N.Y. Supp. 791 (1898); Appeal of Sleeper, 147 Me. 302, 87
A.2d 115 (1952) (dictum).
8. Paetz v. Dain, supra note 7; Colby v. Jackson, supra note 7. The Colby case
held that the right to summarily detain an insane person exists for a relatively short
period of time even though the danger has not abated.
9 PRossax, TORTS § 12, at 61 (3d ed. 1964).
10. Keleher v. Putnam, 60 N.H. 30 (1880). The defendant may, of course, always
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summary arrest by a private person doubtless reflects the value placed on
the right of each man to be free from unwarranted interference with his
person. Concern for the abuses inherent in a system in which one individual
could restrain the freedom of another without the protection of judicial
proceedings, whenever the latter evidenced conduct which some might
call peculiar, played a significant part in imposing this requirement.
This requirement when applied to most private persons seems quite
sound. As one court has said, if there is no immediate danger of physical
injury, those wishing to commit an individual should be required to
use the judicial process, which, it is hoped, will provide a greater degree
of protection for the allegedly insane person."1 While it must be granted
that this strict requirement could lead to a fear of personal liability and
thus a reluctance to use the summary detention process, this reluctance
may be a good thing. The right of one individual to summarily detain
another is a dangerous one, subject to many abuses;12 in the absence of
actual danger, it should not exist at all. 3
There is authority for mitigating the common law requirement of
dangerous insanity when the person causing the restraint is morally re-
sponsible for the care of the one restrained, or is a member of his immediate
family. In Maxwell v. Maxwell, 4 a son had caused his elderly father to
be sent to an old soldier's home. The court ruled that "the natural or
proper custodian of an insane person" may place him in "some proper
place for treatment . . . without warrant, and without judicial proceed-
ings"" if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is
dangerous to himself or others. The Maxwell position seems commendable.
To hold that a person morally charged with the care of another can act
only when dangerous insanity does in fact exist may well render such in-
dividual unable to fulfill his duty of care to the allegedly insane person.
It is also submitted that this privilege should be extended to the other
members of the immediate family or household. They are usually the ones
in imminent danger from an outburst of the allegedly insane person. Their
show good faith to mitigate damages. E.g., Colby v. Jackson, 12 N.H. 526 (1842).
11. Keleher v. Putnam, supra note 10.
12. Although one commentator has suggested that the danger of commitment based
on such wrongful motives as a desire to obtain the allegedly insane person's property
is practically nonexistent, Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.O.L. REv.
274, 293-94 (1953), the cases suggest that such a danger does exist, see, e.g., Dauphine
v. Herbert, 37 So. 2d 829 (La. Ct. App. 1948) (proceedings initiated to prevent
plaintiff's participation in ejectment action).
13. Note, 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 668, 682 (1959).
14. 189 Iowa 7, 177 N.W. 541 (1920).
15. Id. at 10, 177 N.W. at 543.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss2/3
LIABILITY FOR DETENTION OF MENTALLY ILL
personal safety should dictate such a privilege.'6 Furthermore, there is
less likelihood that the detention or arrest will result from some motive
other than concern for the safety of the one arrested when the individual
making the arrest is responsible for the care of the detained or is a member
of his immediate family."
A further problem is the effect of present-day commitment statutes on
the common law right of summary detention. The question is whether the
common law privilege of summary arrest by a private person has been
eliminated by statutes containing a provision for summary detention by a
police or public health officer with no mention of private persons.'8 It is
not clear whether these commitment statutes encompass the entire area of
summary arrest of the mentally ill and thus eliminate the common law
privilege of summary arrest by a private person. Only two cases have
considered the problem.' In the first case, Warner v. State,0 the New
York Court of Appeals said, in dictum, that the statutes have neither
abolished nor enlarged the common law privilege of summary arrest and
detention of the dangerously insane. The other case, Jillson v. Caprio,2'
involving summary arrest by a physician, held that a commitment statute
eliminated any means of commitment which existed at common law.
The JiUson case was careful to point out that its decision applied to private
individuals as well as physicians." The elimination of the common law
right of summary arrest in this indirect manner would be unwise, because,
16. Danger to personal safety has played an important part in liberalizing the law
of summary arrest by a policeman. Note 27 infra and accompanying text. This reason-
ing would seem to apply at least as well to a member of the immediate family or house-
hold.
17. But see Davenport v. Lynch, 51 N.C. (6 Jones L.) 545 (1859); Hinchman v.
Richie, Brightly 143 (Pa. Nisi Prius 1849). Further support for the position advanced
in the text is found in the fact that the law has since an early date considered a lunatic
to be the responsibility of his family. AmIEIUCAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY
DiSABLED AND THE LAW 9-10 (1961).
18. E.g., DRAFT AcT § 8; D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-327 (1961). The Draft Act also
contains a medical certification emergency procedure which allows an individual to be
admitted to a hospital on the written statement of any health or police officer or any
other person that the individual is likely to cause harm to himself or others. This must
be accompanied by the certification of at least one physician that in his opinion the
person is mentally ill and dangerous. DRAFT AcT § 7. This method, it should be noted,
is not quite the same as summary arrest.
19. Jillson v. Caprio, 181 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Warner v. State, 297 N.Y.
395, 79 N.E.2d 459 (1948). For a discussion of the effect of these cases on the police-
man's common law right of summary arrest see notes 27-30 infra and accompanying
text.
20. 297 N.Y. 395, 79 N.E.2d 459 (1948).
21. 181 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
22. Id. at 524.
.197
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as h~ b& A!iiited out, there are some situations in which summary arrest
&is c -' to protect both the'insan person and those near to him.23
B. Police
Police officers are not usually required to act at their peril. The general
vi'ew; allows a peace officer to detain an allegedly insane person without
a warrant if the" officer has Probable cause to believe that the person is
dangerous, to 'himself or' others. 4 This rule has been made statutory in
sbme states 25 4t least one curt has developed a more liberal rule-actual
inanity wfjustify arrest even when no emergency exists.2" An important
factor in liberalizing the rule is undoubtedly the concern for the safety of
thase who come in contact with the insane person:
An insane person is liable to become dangerous at any moment. Must
a.sheriff who sees an insane person, before taking him into custody,
wait until that person shows dangerous tendencies by attacking an-
other? . . . The 'lawv has a higher regard for the protection of . . .
others.27
The tendercy of the courts to liberalize the law of summary arrest by
police' officers is understandable. It is inevitable that policemen, in the per-
"forance of their duties,'will come into contact with mentally ill persons;
'when a disturbance" is caused by an unbalanced person, it is logical to call
the police: "In such situations, the police officer will often have to use sum-
mary methods if he is to protect the allegedly insane person and others
from injury.
'Only bne court has directly considered the question of whether the exis-
'23. See note 16 sitpra and accompanying text.
24.' Orvis v. Brickmian, 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Christiansen v. Weston, 36
Ariz.'200, 284 Fac. 149 (1930); Paetz v. Dairi, I Wils. 148 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1872);
Frsythe v.'Ivey, 162 Miss. 471, 139 So. 615 (1932); see Babb v. Carson, 116 Kan.
690, 229 Pac. 76 (1924). Contra, Look v. Dean, 108 Mass. 116 (1871).
25.'LAL. PeN. CODE § 847; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.10 (Page Supp. 1965).
26. Witte v. Raben, 131 Minn. 71, 154 N.W. 662 (1915) (dictum). In Cahill v.
Mhaelis,' 170 Fed. 66 (2d Cir. 1909), the court was concerned with a New York
siatute which allowed a policeman to arrest any apparently insane person conducting
'hin seif in a manner 'which, for a sane person, would amount to disorderly conduct.
"Tile case is unusual iii that the statute was used to protect an employer who had the
police arrest, without a warrant, an employee of eccentric habits who had refused to
leave After discharge. 'One' court, in construing its particular statute, may have gone
even farther and h eld that the existence of probable cause to believe that a person is
isam ue l validaie his arrest. Babb v. Carson, 116 Kan. 690, 229 Pac. 76 (1924).
27. Id. at 693, 229 Pac. at 77-78. California has liberalized the rule in a different
manner by shifting the burden of proof from the defendant policeman, on whom it
traditionally lies in an action of false imprisonment, to the plaintiff. Whaley v. Kirby,
208 Cal. App. 2d 232, 25 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
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tence of emergency detention statutes has pre-empted the policeman's com-
mon law privilege of summary arrest.2" In Orvis v. Brickman,29 a police
officer who had sent a probably suicidal person to the hospital suggested in
his report that she be given a mental examination. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute, which provided for arrest
by an officer only when the allegedly insane person is found in a "public
place," was not "intended to supersede the common law power of emer-
gency arrest."'" The court held the officer's action was justified even though
the plaintiff had been "found" in her apartment.
Despite the fact that the law of summary arrest by police is much more
liberal than that applied to private persons, the police are apparently hesi-
tant to arrest someone on a basis as ill-defined as mental illness. When pos-
sible, they prefer to place the arrest on such firmer grounds as a misde-
meanor committed in the officer's presence-for example, disturbing the
peace." By placing the arrest on that basis, the policeman can avoid the
necessity of deciding in questionable cases whether a seemingly deranged
person constitutes a danger to himself or others, and thus, reduce the danger
of civil liability. The police argue that this device accomplishes substantially
the same result as summary arrest based on mental illness. Following the
arrest, the police can either take the person to the hospital or notify the
hospital that he is in police custody.1
2
However, at least one article has criticized this procedure on the ground
that the allegedly insane person will often languish in jail awaiting trial on
28. Orvis v. Brickman, 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952); see Warner v. State, 297
N.Y. 395, 79 N.E.2d 459 (1948) (discussed in text accompanying note 20 supra).
29. 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
30. Id. at 767.
31. This reluctance is indicated by one police training bulletin which, after stating
the rule that a person who appears mentally ill can be arrested on that basis only
when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is dangerous, goes
on to state*
If, however, in addition to displaying symptoms of mental illness, the person at-
tempted or did commit some offense in the officer's presence, the officer would be
justified in concluding that the person might injure himself or others. The offense
committed might be, for example, a disturbance of the peace, an act of malicious
mischief, or assault. If the person did commit a misdemeanor in the officer's
presence, the officer would have authority to arrest the person.
Often a person will display symptoms of mental illness, but will commit no of-
fense in the officer's presence. Complainants, friends, or relatives of such person
may, however, state that he committed some public offense prior to the officer's
arrival. In these situations, or in any case when the officer's authority to act is
not clear, advice should be secured by calling the Hospital Division. Los ANG-LES
POLICE DEP'r, DAILY TRAIMNIN BULLETIN 56 (1958).
32. Id. at 56, 62.
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the misdemeanor charge at a time when he should be receiving medical
treatment. 3
Although the hesitancy of the police to follow a course of action which
includes a greater possibility of civil liability is understandable, the better
practice seems to be to use the traditional summary arrest procedure based
on insanity if the person does appear to be dangerous. The general rule
which gives a police officer the right of summary arrest if he has probable
cause to believe that the person is insane and dangerous seems to offer suffi-
cient protection to the officer exercising reasonably careful judgment. Since
anyone who is in such a mental state that he constitutes a danger to him-
self or others probably needs immediate medical attention, it is preferable for
the police to use this direct procedure.
C. Physicians
Only one case has involved a summary arrest by a doctor. In Jillson v.
Caprio,3" a doctor instigated the arrest of plaintiff on his certification alone,
although the certification of two doctors was required by statute." The
court found the doctor liable for false imprisonment even though there was
strong evidence that the plaintiff was dangerous at the time of arrest. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals was unwilling to look past
the statutory means for detention to any common law method. Thus,
this court would not give the physician the right of summary arrest
on the ground of dangerous insanity, even though most jurisdictions give
this right to a layman. 6 Moreover, this court clearly would not give the
common law right to a layman. In holding that "the most reasonable belief
that they [the allegedly insane persons] will do harm in the future does not
justify the doctor or layman in arresting them without statutory authoriza-
tion and without warrant,"3" the court did not distinguish between doctors
and laymen.
Even if one could justify the theory that a layman should have no right of
summary arrest, it is highly questionable whether a doctor, acting in his
professional capacity, should be denied this right. The effect of this holding
33. Slovenko & Super, The Mentally Disabled, the Law and the Report of the
American Bar Foundation, 47 VA. L. REv. 1366, 1372 (1961). However, while stating
that the detention of the mentally ill in jail cells is deplorable, the authors pointed
out that it is no more so than the use of the "closed wards" provided for extremely
disturbed patients in some hospitals. Ibid.
34. 181 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1950). For a discussion of this decision's bearing on
commitment by medical certification see note 49 infra and accompanying text.
35. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-327 (1961).
36. Authorities cited note 7 supra.
37. Jillson v. Caprio, 181 F.2d 523, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1950). (Emphasis added.)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss2/3
LIABILITY FOR DETENTION OF MENTALLY ILL
is that a doctor who found on the basis of his training and experience that
a patient was dangerously insane could take no direct action. Therefore, in
this jurisdiction, a doctor must either wait for certification by another doc-
tor or go through the even longer process of judicial proceedings. This
holding completely ignores the fact that a doctor is better qualified than
anyone to determine whether or not a person is insane and dangerous. To
place a physician in a position where he may be forced to stand idly by
while an insane individual injures himself or others is unreasonable." The
Draft Act has solved the problem raised by the Jillson case by prescribing
an emergency procedure whereby a doctor may commit a dangerous person
on his certification alone.39
II. MEDICAL CERTIFICATION
Many statutes provide for commitment without judicial proceedings upon
the application of the family or "next friend" of the patient when accom-
panied by a certificate of either one or two licensed physicians confirming
insanity.'" While some statutes, which ostensibly are medical certification
statutes, require "endorsement" or "approval" by a judge or court officer,
only cases involving no such judicial process will be included in this sec-
tion. 1 The grounds for a medical commitment depend, of course, on the
wording of the particular statute and the judicial construction of that
statute. Some statutes provide that a person may be committed by medical
certification only when the certificate alleges that he is mentally ill and dan-
gerous to himself or others.' Thus, in these jurisdictions, the conditions
38. It is interesting to note that this court in a later decision held that the police-
man's common law right of summary arrest was not affected by statute. Orvis v. Brick-
man, 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Apparently the court felt that the policy reasons
favoring the policeman's common law right were sufficient to overcome its position in
ilison.
39. DAFT AcT § 7.
40. E.g., DRAFT ACT §§ 6-7; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91Y2, §§ 6-1, 7-1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1965); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 72, 75; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§
5122.06, .08 (Page Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 37-103 (Supp. 1964).
41. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-504 (Supp. 1965). Although this division
does not follow the nomenclature of the statutes, such statutes present separate problems
which will be discussed infra in the section entitled "Judicial Proceedings."
42. E.g., DRAFT ACT § 7; OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 5122.08 (Page Supp. 1965)
(emergency hospitalization with medical certification by one physician); cf. Belger v.
Arnot, 344 Mass. 679, 183 N.E.2d 866 (1962); Karjavainen v. Buswell, 289 Mass. 419,
194 N.E. 295 (1935). Ohio also has a "nonjudicial hospitalization" procedure whereby
it is necessary that the certificate, which must be signed by two physicians, allege only
that the patient is a "mentally ill individual subject to hospitalization by court order."
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.06 (Page Supp. 1965).
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precedent for commitment by means of medical certification are the same
as those for summary arrest-the patient must be dangerously insane.
However, the existence of a medical certification statute protects a doctor
who acts in good faith from actions of false imprisonment or negligence."
Proof of compliance with the statute has the effect of raising a presumption
that the imprisonment was lawful. It then becomes the burden of the plain-
tiff in a false imprisonment action to prove bad faith on the part of the
physician.44
The courts have disagreed as to the effect of a physician's noncompli-
ance with a certification statute on his possible liability in a false imprison-
ment action. Some courts have held that a failure to conform to the statu-
tory requirements is merely evidence of bad faith which may be outweighed
by contrary evidence.4
Other courts, however, have held that failure to follow the statutory pro-
cedure results in liability regardless of other factors indicating good faith.
Thus, in Maben v. Rankin," the court said that if it can be shown that the
defendant physician did not examine the plaintiff, as the statute required,
within three days before her admission to the sanitarium, he is liable. The
rationale behind this point of view was stated in Frey v. Barr:47
It [the Act] was passed to protect the liberty of our citizens by prevent-
ing the commitment of sane persons to such institutions. The power
43. Maben v. Rankln, 55 Cal. 2d 139, 358 P.2d 681 (1961); Belger v. Arnot, 344
Mass. 679, 183 N.E.2d 866 (1962); Karjavainen v. Buswell, 289 Mass. 419, 194 N.E.
295 (1935); Schall v. Irwin, 120 Misc. 573, 199 N.Y. Supp. 141 (Sup. Ct. 1923)
(dictum), aff'd, 212 App. Div. 834, 207 N.Y. Supp. 914 (1925); cf. Miller v. West,
165 Md. 245, 167 Adt. 696 (1933); Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90 (1879)
(superintendent of asylum not liable if he acts in good faith); Williams v. Lebar, 141
Pa. 149, 21 At. 525 (1891) (no presumption of negligence from defendant doctors'
error about plaintiff's sanity). This rule has been followed even when the medical
certification statute explicitly provided protection only for institutions and their
personnel, but did not mention committing physicians. Maben v. Rankln, supra; Belger
v. Arnot, supra.
44. E.g., Maben v. Rankin, supra note 43. The difficulty of the plaintiff's case was
compounded by the Maben court, which held that the plaintiff must show the bad
faith by "positive and direct" proof, thus rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the
malice of her husband, who had instigated the examination, should transfer to the
physician.
45. O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 227 La. 262, 79 So. 2d 87 (1955); Miller v, West,
165 Md. 245, 167 Atl. 696 (1933) (failure to examine); Karjavainen v. Buswell, 289
Mass. 419, 194 N.E. 295 (1935); Bacon v. Bacon, 76 Miss. 458, 24 So. 968 (1899)
(failure to examine).
46. 55 Cal. 2d 139, 358 P.2d 681 (1961). According to this court, "the involuntary
hospitalization of a person in a mental institution in violation of the statute constitutes
false imprisonment." Id. at 144, 358 P.2d at 683.
47. 28 Pa. Dist. 570, 36 Lane. L. Rev. 101 (C.P. 1919).
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given. . . by the Act is a dangerous one, and is only to be exercised
where all the requirements of the Act have been complied with.,5
Although the latter position may seem harsh, especially when other facts
indicating probable cause exist, one may argue that since the procedures
are designed to effectuate the easy commitment of the mentally ill, it is not
asking too much of the certifying physician to stay within the safeguards
provided. It should be noted that Jillson v. Caprio4" illustrated a situation
in which the physician's noncompliance with the statute seems entirely rea-
sonable. However, Jillson is an exceptional noncompliance case; most of
these cases involve nothing more than carelessness on the part of the certify-
ing physician. Moreover, as pointed out above, all the problems of the
Jillson case are solved by a statute such as section 7 of the Draft Act, which
allows emergency comnutment upon the certification of one doctor. When
a medical certification statute allows certification by one doctor upon his
examination of the patient, full compliance with the statute should be re-
quired to protect the physician from liability, since all he has to do to com-
ply with the statute is examine the patient. If the physician fails to fulfill
that basic requirement, if in fact he has no personal knowledge of the pa-
tient's mental condition, he should not sign the certificate.
A further question arises as to the effect of medical certification on the
liability of individuals other than the certifying physician. When the suit is
against the party who instigated the commitment or obtained the certificate
from the doctor, liability may be imposed, despite the existence of a valid
certificate, if the plaintiff can show bad faith."0 This result is more likely if
the certificate was made solely in reliance on information supplied by the
defendant."1 Otherwise, the existence of a valid certificate is at least strong
evidence of probable cause for the commitment and of the absence of bad
faith.
If, however, the certificate is invalid-for example, only one doctor's sig-
nature was obtained when two were needed-the legal justification for
the detention is removed and the burden of going forward with the evidence
is shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant, as in a normal summary arrest
case.
5 2
48. Id. at 571, 36 Lanc. L. Rev at 102.
49. 181 F.2d 523 (1950). For a discussion of the Jillson case see text accompanying
notes 34-37 supra.
50. O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 227 La. 262, 79 So. 2d 87 (1955) (brother-in-law liable);
Karjavainen v. Buswell, 289 Mass. 419, 194 N.E. 295 (1935) (plaintiff's employer
liable); Bacon v. Bacon, 76 Miss. 458, 24 So. 968 (1899); see Frey v. Barr, 28 Pa.
Dist. 570, 36 Lanc. L. Rev. 101 (C.P. 1919).
51. E.g., Bacon v. Bacon, supra note 50.
52. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
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It is clear that one, such as the superintendent of a mental hospital, who
subsequently relies on a certificate which is valid on its face is protected
from liability. 3
III. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
This section deals with those cases in which either judicial authority for
commitment was obtained or commitment by judicial procedure was at-
tempted. The type of judicial participation involved in these cases ranges
from a full hearing before a court and perhaps a jury"' to the issuance of a
commitment order upon the presentation of certificates of insanity by one
or more qualified physicians,55 or the endorsement of certificates of insanity
as required by some medical certification statutes."8 In all of these situations,
the most important question with regard to commitment by means of
judicial proceedings is the extent to which their use protects the participants
in the commitment action.
A. Commitment Unsuccessful
If commitment was attempted unsuccessfully, the allegedly insane person
may have an action of malicious prosecution. However, the plaintiff in
such an action must meet some fairly stringent requirements. He is required
to prove that the defendant initiated the original proceedings with malicious
intent and without probable cause, that the original proceedings terminated
in his favor, and that he suffered injury as a result." The failure to prove
any one of these elements defeats the plaintiff's action.'
A problem peculiar to a malicious prosecution action is the requirement
that the plaintiff must show a termination of the original proceedings in his
favor.59 Some courts have been very strict in applying this requirement to
an action based on a commitment attempt. The rule has been applied even
when the original proceeding consisted only of the issuance of an order of
commitment by the court based solely on certifications of insanity by two
physicians.6 0
53. E.g., Felix v. Hall-Brooke Sanitarium, 140 Conn. 496, 101 A.2d 500 (1953).
The court said that "since the emergency certificate met all the conditions prescribed
by the statute, its delivery to the defendant carried immunity from an action for false
imprisonment." Id. at 500, 101 A.2d at 502.
54. E.g.,DRAFT ACT § 9; MicH. STAT, ANN. § 14.811 (Supp. 1965).
55. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91Y, § 1-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); Miirt. STAT.
ANN. § 14.809 (1956).
56 E.g., DRAFT AcT § 7; N.Y. MENTAL HYoIENE LAW § 73.
57. PRossER, TORTs § 114, at 873-75 (3d ed. 1964).
58. Ibid.
59. E.g., Fetterley v. Gibson, 210 Cal. 282, 283, 291 Pac. 411, 412 (1930).
60. Rouse v. Twin Pines Sanitarium, 162 Cal. App. 2d 639, 328 P.2d 536 (1958).
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This rigorous burden placed on the plaintiff has been lessened by some
courts. Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court recently held that a
plaintiff, found sane in a habeas corpus hearing after an original finding of
insanity, had shown sufficient evidence of termination in her favor to submit
the question to the jury." This decision was based in part on the court's
interpretation of the relevant commitment statute, which warned that
"neither the institution of the proceeding... as provided in this section nor
the order of commitment by the clerk shall have the effect of creating any
presumption that such person is legally incompetent for any purpose."' 2
Similarly, an early Colorado case stated in dictum that a plaintiff, found
insane in the original proceeding but later found "not insane" in the same
court, could allege a termination in his favor.'3 The reasoning was based on
a statute declaring that all lunacy proceedings, orders, and judgments are of
a continuing character and are open to change or modification on the ap-
plication of any party in interest.'
In both of these cases, the courts used statutes primarily aimed at insuring
the right of a person committed to an institution to prove his sanity at any
time, and thereby procure his speedy release, to liberalize the rules of plead-
ing in malicious prosecution. As a result, a plaintiff may be able to use any
subsequent adjudication of his sanity to fulfill the termination requirement
of a malicious prosecution action. The practical effect of these holdings is
to eliminate the requirement imposed by most courts that the original pro-
ceedings must terminate in the plaintiff's favor."
An early California case, Kellogg v. Cochran, 87 Cal. 192, 25 Pac. 677 (1890), held
that the order of commitment was neither conclusive evidence nor probable cause for
believing that the person committed was insane. This reasoning has been rejected by
the later California cases, Fetterley and Rouse. Undoubtedly the Kellogg case is no
longer law in California.
61. Fowle v. Fowle, 263 N.C. 724, 728, 140 S.E.2d 398, 401 (1965).
62. Ibid.
63. Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 Pac. 400 (1923).
64. Id. at 152, 214 Pac. at 403. A later Colorado Supreme Court case reached a
similar result when the plaintiff had been committed by a judge upon the request of
a physician. The court decided that an action of malicious prosecution would lie in
spite of a statute which provided that "such an order of the court shall be complete
protection for the confinement, examination, diagnosis, observation and treatment of
such patient as against all persons." The court construed the statute to protect only
those persons who, after the entry of a "hold and treat order," have the responsibility
pursuant to the order for the "confinement, examination, diagnosis, observation and
treatment" of the patient, not the instigators of the proceedings. The court said that
to hold otherwise would make the statute void as a violation of a Colorado constitutional
guarantee that a speedy remedy be provided for every injury to person, property or
character. Lowen v. Hilton, 142 Colo. 200, 204, 351 P.2d 881, 883-84 (1960).
65. The Nebraska court has lessened the burden of the requirement by holding that
the finding of insanity by "commissioners of insanity" was not conclusive, but only
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One of the most unusual features of the action of malicious prosecution
is that the existence of probable cause is generally a question for the judge
rather than the jury. Thus, if the facts are not in dispute, or if the same
conclusion could be reached no matter which set of facts is believed, the
judge decides the question. If the existence or nonexistence of probable
cause depends on which set of facts is believed, the judge leaves the deter-
mination of fact to the jury and either instructs them as to what conclusions
they must reach if certain facts are found or decides probable cause him-
self on the basis of the findings of the jury.6"
This assumption of a typical jury function by the court is an attempt to.
protect those who institute a commitment in good faith from the uncertain-
ties of a jury verdict17 For a number of reasons, this practice seems appro-
priate when the suit is based on an unsuccessful commitment action. First,
if, at the time the malicious prosecution action is tried, the plaintiff is sane,
the impact on the jury may cause it to refuse to believe the evidence intro-
duced to show probable cause at the time of the commitment. Furthermore,
the facts introduced to show probable cause may be of such a technical na-
ture that a jury will not be able to comprehend them. As one authority has
put -it, having the jury decide such questions is tantamount to having a
jury decide whether or not the plaintiff displayed symptoms indicating
meningitis.0 " The jury simply does not have the training to make such a
decision. The same point might be made with respect to the court, but
given the lack of technical training on the part of both judge and jury, the
judge will (1) be more likely to understand the technical testimony intro-
duced to show that probable cause did or did not exist and (2) be better
able to look past the emotional issues which are inevitably involved in a
malicious prosecution action based on an attempted commitment.
"prima facie evidence of probable cause." Figg v. Hanger, 4 Neb. Unof. 792, 96 N.W.
658 (1903).
66. E.g., Johnson v. Huhner, 76 N.D. 13, 33 N.W.2d 268 (1948). Contra, Perez v.
Rodriguez, 155 Fla. 501, 20 So. 2d 654 (1945); see Sutherland v. Palme, 93 Cal. App.
2d 307, 208 P.2d 1035 (1949).
67. See Treloar v, Harris, 66 Ind. App. 59, 117 N.B. 975 (1917). A look at two
recent California appellate court decisions reveals the difference in outcome which can
occur when the question of probable cause is decided by the judge rather than the
jury. In Jensen v. Leonard, 82 Cal. App. 2d 340, 186 P.2d 206 (1947), the trial judge
had directed a verdict for the defendant because the plaintiff's testimony did not
"amount to that sub'stantial evidence required to create a conflict on the issue of probable
cause." Id. at 354, 186 P.2d at 215. In Sutherland v. Palme, supra note 66, the court
held that even though there was no evidence of malice and the preponderance of evi-
dence indicated the existence of probable cause, the existence of some contrary evidence
was sufficient to support the jury's verdict for the plaintiff.
68. Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REv. 274 (1953).
206 •
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B. Commitment Successful
Since a court order of commitment which is valid on its face establishes
legal authority for the patient's detention, 9 it might seem to follow that the
initiator of the action would be absolutely protected from subsequent lia-
bility. This, however, is not necessarily true; even when a valid commit-
ment order has been obtained, the instigator may still be liable.
Courts have imposed such liability on a theory of malicious abuse of
process if there was perversion or improper use of the legal process by the
individual initiating the legal proceedings."
According to Prosser, this action differs from malicious prosecution in
that the gist of the tort is not commencing an action or causing process to
issue without justification, but misusing or misapplying process, justified in
itself, for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish. The
essential elements of the tort as it has developed are (1) an ulterior purpose
and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular
conduct of the proceedings." Thus it has been held that the action would
not lie when the lunacy proceeding was brought to prevent the plaintiff
from executing a will72 or to bring the plaintiff into public disgrace. 3 These
courts require that the plaintiff show not only the existence of an ulterior
motive, but also an act in the use of the legal process not proper in the regu-
lar proceedings, such as threatening the continuation of the proceedings to
extort money.74
One court, however, has ignored the latter requirement and held that the
allegation that the defendant doctor initiated lunacy proceedings solely for
the purpose of getting rid of a troublesome patient stated a cause of action
for malicious abuse of process."
As a general rule, the action of false imprisonment will not lie if there is
69. E.g., Smith v. Fish, 182 Ark. 115, 30 S.W.2d 223 (1930).
70. E.g., Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 Pac. 400 (1923); Bailey v. McGill,
247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957).
71. PROSSER, TORTS § 114, at 876 (3d ed. 1964).
72. Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 7 N.E.2d 268, rehearing denied, 274 N.Y. 489,
8 N.E.2d 617 (1937).
73. Hocker v. Welti, 239 Ill. App. 392 (1926).
74. Hocker v. Welti, supra note 73; Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 7 N.E.2d
268, rehearing denied, 274 N.Y. 489, 8 N.E.2d 617 (1937); Barnette v. Woody, 242
N.C. 424, 88 S.E.2d 223 (1955).
75. Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957); accord, Coulter v.
Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 Pac. 400 (1923). The Bailey case is extremely interesting
since it arose in the same jurisdiction as Bamette v. Woody, supra note 74, in which the
court had adhered to the general rule that the plaintiff must show the existence of an
ulterior motive and an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular proceed-
ings. The court in Bailey simply ignored the Barnette decision.
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legal authority for the incarceration derived from a court of competent
jurisdiction. T8 The theory is that by complying with the formal require-
ments of the law, the instigator makes the imprisonment the act of the
court or the state rather than his own, and thus cannot be responsible for
the imprisonment." Most opinions hold that if the court was the proper
one in which to bring lunacy proceedings, its authority is sufficient to pro-
tect the participants from liability in a false imprisonment action. Any errors
in obtaining jurisdiction of the case, such as failure to serve notice, can only
be corrected by the erring court or by appellate review."8
Some courts, however, have allowed an action for false imprisonment
against an instigator bringing the commitment proceeding in bad faith de-
spite judicial approval of the original commitment."9 Proving liability for
this tort is, however, no easy task. As one court held,"' "The order of com-
mitment... was prima facie evidence of the plaintiff's insanity"; this im-
poses the burden of proving bad faith on the plaintiff. In the cases where
liability was imposed, the evidence of bad faith or malice was quite strong,"1
indicating that bad faith must be proven directly and cannot be inferred
76. E.g., Guzy v. Guzy, 16 Misc. 2d 975, 185 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Pate
v. Stevens, 257 S.W.2d 763, 767 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); PROSSER, TORTS § 12, at 62
(3d ed. 1964).
77. Ibid.
78. Pate v. Stevens, 257 S.W.2d 763, 767 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Dedrick v. Dun-
ham, 136 Wash. 265, 239 Pac. 385 (1925); see Ussery v. Haynes, 344 Mo. 530, 127
S.W.2d 410 (1939); cf. Getsinger v. Corbell, 188 N.C. 533, 125 S.E. 180 (1924) (failure
to comply with notice requirements evidence of bad faith). But see Troutman v. State,
273 App. Div. 619, 79 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1948); Washer v. Slater, 67 App. Div. 385, 73
N.Y. Supp. 425 (1901); Mierop v. State, 22 Misc. 2d 216, 201 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Ct. Cl.
1960).
Any person subsequently relying on or enforcing a judicial order which is valid on its
face and issued by a court of competent jurisdiction will always be protected from
liability in false imprisonment. E.g., Smith v. Fish, 182 Ark. 115, 30 S.W.2d 223 (1930).
In Zinkhan v. District of Columbia, 50 App. D.C. 312, 271 Fed. 542 (Ct. App. 1921),
the superintendent of the asylum and jail was liable for incarcerating the plaintiff in
reliance on the penciled authorization of a precinct desk sergeant which was not ac-
companied by other necessary papers.
79. Boesch v. Kick, 98 N.J.L. 183, 119 At. 1 (1922); Sheean v. Holman, 6 N.J.
Misc. 346, 141 At. 170 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (personal animosity); Dougherty v. Snyder,
97 Mo. App. 495, 71 S.W. 463 (1903) (dictum); see Comfort v. Young, 100 Iowa
627, 69 N.W. 1032 (1897); Morris v. University of Texas, 348 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961). In Comfort, a libel action against the instigator of lunacy proceedings, the
court said, "Persons have the undisputed right to file such informations as the one
referred to, when made in good faith and in the honest belief that the statements
therein made are true." Comfort v. Young, supra at 629, 69 N.W. at 1033.
80. Schall v. Irwin, 120 Misc. 573, 575, 199 N.Y. Supp. 141, 143 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
81. Boesch v. Kick, 98 N.J.L. 183, 119 At. 1 (1922); Sheean v. Holman, 6 N.J.
Misc. 346, 141 At. 170 (Sup. Ct. 1928); see Comfort v. Young, 100 Iowa 627, 69
N.W. 1032 (1897).
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from a lack of probable cause, as may be done in an action for malicious
prosecution. 2
A few courts have found certifying physicians who acted as witnesses in
the commitment proceedings (rather than as instigators) liable for false
imprisonment for negligently certifying that the plaintiff was insane.83 An
old New York case, Ayers v. Russell, 4 held that certifying doctors have the
duty of making the examination with ordinary care.
Other courts, considering a false imprisonment action against a physician
who testified against the allegedly insane person, have dealt with the ques-
tion of civil liability in terms of the privilege afforded a witness in a judicial
proceeding. 5 The privilege granted to such a physician may be qualified86
or absolute. Thus the Massachusetts court in Niven v. Boland8" held that
the certifying physician was protected by a qualified privilege-so long as
he acted in good faith and without malice."9 However, in a later decision,
Mezullo v. Maletz,'o the same court held that the privilege granted the cer-
tifying physician was absolute. The court relied on the following reasoning
from Niven v. Boland:
It is more important that the administration of the law in the manner
provided should not be obstructed by the fears of physicians that they
may render themselves liable to suit, than it is that the person certified
82. Sutherland v. Palme, 93 Cal. App. 2d 307, 208 P.2d 1035 (1949); Dugan v.
Midwest Cap Co., 213 Iowa 751, 239 N.W. 697 (1931); Manz v. Kippel, 158 Wis.
557, 149 N.W. 375 (1941); Johnson v. Huhner, 76 N.D. 13, 33 N.W.2d 268 (1948)
(dictum).
83. Hough v. Ogden, 4 N.J. Misc. 455, 133 Atl. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Walder v.
Manahan, 21 N.J. Misc. 1, 29 A.2d 395 (Cir. Ct. 1942).
84. 50 Hun 282, 3 N.Y. Supp. 338 (1888).
85. Of privilege in general, Prosser has said:
In its broader sense, it is applied to any immunity which prevents the existence
of a tort; but in its more common usage, it signifies that the defendant has acted
to further an interest of such social importance that it is entitled to protection,
even at the expense of damage to the plainiff. PROSSER, TORTS § 16, at 99 (3d
ed. 1964).
For an illustration of this reasoning and its effect see Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233,
118 N.E.2d 356 (1954).
86. Christopher v. Henry, 284 Ky. 127, 143 S.W.2d 1069 (1940); Niven v. Boland,
177 Mass. 11, 58 N.E. 282 (1900); Ussery v. Haynes, 344 Mo. 530, 127 S.W.2d 410
(1939); Springer v. Steiner, 91 Ore. 100, 178 Pac. 592 (1919).
87. Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378 (1927); Hurley v. Towne, 155 Me.
433, 156 A.2d 377 (1959); Dabkowski v. Davis, 364 Mich. 429, 111 N.W.2d 68 (1961);
Dyer v. Dyer, 178 Tenn. 234, 156 S.W.2d 445 (1941); see Beckham v. Cline, 151 Fla.
481, 10 So. 2d 419 (1942); Brady v. Collom, 68 R.I. 299, 27 A.2d 311 (1942).
88. 177 Mass. 11, 58 N.E. 282 (1900).
89. Id. at 14, 58 N.E. at 283.
90. 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1954).
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by them to be insane... should have a right of action in case it turns
out that the certificate ought not to have been given.9'
Obviously this court felt that the need to develop laws to protect those
who might be involved in judicial commitment procedures outweighed the
possibility that a person wrongfully committed might have no redress for
any injury suffered.
A Rhode Island case, Brady v. Collom,92 held the privilege to be absolute
also. However, this was done on the ground that the doctors were only
"witnesses in a hearing before a judicial tribunal, in which the plaintiff...
had an opportunity to be heard and to introduce evidence.'" 3 The
Mezullo case made no such statement and presumably the absolute privi-
lege granted there would apply to any judicial proceeding regardless
of its character. The Michigan Supreme Court has actually reached this
result by holding that an absolute privilege exists even though the judicial
proceeding involved no more than the signing of an emergency order of
commitment by a judge.9
It is important to note that all the cases in which liability was im-
posed involved summary type proceedings at which the plaintiff was
neither present nor represented, a proceeding which required only the
judge's approval of the physician's application for commitment and gave
the plaintiff no opportunity to defend himself."5 The importance of this
factor (inability to defend oneself) is demonstrated by a Florida false im-
prisonment decision. The Florida Supreme Court held that the fact that the
defendant physicians had failed to give the plaintiff the required examina-
tion, thereby depriving the plaintiff of notice of the commitment hearing
91. Id. at 237, 118 N.E.2d at 359.
92. 68 R.I. 299, 27 A.2d 311 (1942).
93. Id. at 302, 27 A.2d at 312. (Emphasis added.) Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun 282,
3 N.Y. Supp. 338 (Sup. Ct. 1888), held that certifying doctors were privileged only if
they discharged their duty (examination of the plaintiff) with ordinary care. The court
in Brady distinguished Ayers on the ground that the proceedings in Ayers were summary
in character.
94. Dabkowski v. Davis, 364 Mich. 429, 111 N.W.2d 68 (1961). The proceedings
in this case involved an application to the probate court for plaintiff's commitment.
While the application was pending, the defendant doctors submitted certificates stating
that the plaintiff was dangerous and should be committed pending the hearing. In
fact the physicians had not examined the plaintiff.
95. Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 Pac. 400 (1923); Beckham v. Cline, 151
Fla. 481, 10 So. 2d 419 (1942); Boesch v. Kick, 98 N.J.L. 183, 119 Atl. 1 (1922);
Sheean v. Holman, 6 N.J. Misc. 346, 141 Atl. 170 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Hough v. Ogden,
4 N.J. Misc. 455, 133 Ati. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Walder v. Manahan, 21 N.J. Misc. 1,
29 A.2d 395 (Cir. Ct. 1942); Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun 282, 3 N.Y. Supp. 338 (Sup.
Ct. 1888); Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957).
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and consequently of the opportunity to defend herself,"6 was significant to
the imposition of liability.
C. An Appraisal: Recovery Against Participants in
Judicial Proceedings
It should be evident from the foregoing discussion that within a particu-
lar jurisdiction the chance of recovery for wrongful commitment by means
of judicial proceedings may well depend upon the peculiar characteristics
of the different forms of action and upon which of these actions the plain-
tiff chooses to bring. That is, a plaintiff's recovery may depend on whether
he brings an action for malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, or
false imprisonment.
To illustrate-suppose a defendant doctor has a patient committed
solely because the patient is a hypochondriac who constantly annoys the
physician with his every ache and pain. If the original commitment was
successful, in the majority of jurisdictions an action of malicious prosecution
would fail because the plaintiff, even if later proved sane, could not allege
termination of the original proceedings in his favor. Similarly, an action of
malicious abuse of process would fail unless the plaintiff could show "an act
in the use of the process not proper in regular conduct of the proceedings."
If the plaintiff brings an action of false imprisonment, in most jurisdictions
he would not recover because there would be legal authority for the impris-
onment. The confusion is multiplied when one recalls that in certain juris-
dictions the traditional requirements of malicious prosecution, malicious
abuse of process, and false imprisonment have been relaxed. Thus, in the
hypothetical case, the plaintiff may be able to recover in an action of malici-
ous prosecution if the court should decide to re-interpret the termination re-
quirement. Also, recovery may be had for malicious abuse of process if the
court should adopt the minority position and allow recovery on the basis of
improper motive alone. False imprisonment will lie if the court chooses to
allow recovery on a showing of bad faith despite the legal authority for the
incarceration.
One obvious objection to all this is that recovery will depend on the tech-
96. Beckham v. Cline, supra note 95. This is so in Florida because of a statute
which provides that following the examination, a report is sent to the person examined,
affording him an opportunity to appear before the court and contest the findings of
the committee. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.22(4) (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.22(6)
(Supp. 1965). Brady v. Collom, 68 R.I. 299, 27 A.2d 311 (1942), where the patient's
opportunity to defend himself at the judicial proceeding was an important factor in
the court's finding of no liability, is in accord on this point. For a further discussion of
the Brady case see note 93 supra and accompanying text.
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nicalities of common law forms of action. A plaintiff may be denied redress
for wrongful commitment if he has brought a cause of action in which he
cannot meet one of the technical pleading requirements.
Some may argue that these problems are not particularly serious since,
if a plaintiff discovers that he has chosen the wrong action, he may simply
begin his case anew under a different theory. However, such a procedure
is at least time consuming, especially if the first action should reach the ap-
pellate level, and may be so expensive that the plaintiff will be unwilling or
unable to try again. A further possibility is that, because of the time con-
sumed by the first action, the applicable statute of limitations may run, pre-
venting a subsequent action."
An even more serious objection to the importance placed on the techni-
cal requirements of these various forms of action is that this emphasis ob-
scures more important considerations. One finds little discussion of whether
the protection from civil liability afforded the participants in judicial com-
mitment proceedings should vary with the type of judicial proceeding in-
volved. Should an individual involved in a commitment proceeding which
amounts to no more than the court's endorsing a medical certificate signed
by a physician receive the same protection as a participant in a full hearing
before a judge and jury? Should the cloak of judicial participation shield
the participants in a proceeding in which judicial approval serves as no
more than a rubber stamp of a doctor's certification?
It is submitted that where the procedure involved is a full hearing in
which the allegedly insane person has the opportunity to defend himself, the
participants should be completely immune from any later civil liability,
if insanity is found. The allegedly insane person has ample opportunity to
prove his sanity; thus, the possibility of wrongful commitment is greatly
97. Another statute of limitations problem revolves around the effect that a plaintiff's
imprisonment for mental incompetency will have on his ability to bring a wrongful
commitment action. Two cases illustrate this problem.
In Mierop v. State, 22 Misc. 2d 216, 201 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Ct. Cl. 1960), the plaintiff
had been committed on August 9, and released on habeas corpus on August 17. There
was a ninety-day limit on filing notice of intent to sue. The court held that the notice
filed by the plaintiff on November 14 was timely, because, as provided by statute, a
person confined in the state hospital is under a legal disability whether he is, in fact,
sane or insane. However in Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 190 S.W.2d 994 (1945),
the Missouri court held that a statute which required that a malpractice suit be brought
within two years, unless at the time the cause of action accrued the party was disabled
because of insanity, barred a plaintiff who had not brought her action within that
period. The court construed "disability" as requiring actual insanity rather than any
disability caused by a judgment of insanity. These cases indicate how a court's attitude
toward the civil liability of those participating in the commitment of the mentally ill
can be reflected in a decision which is seemingly based on procedural problems alone.
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reduced. Even the fact that the instigator of the proceedings acted from
such improper motives as greed or personal antipathy should not alter this
result. If the defendant in the commitment action is in fact insane, he will
not be damaged by commitment; on the contrary, he will benefit from it."8
A more difficult problem arises if the commitment proceeding results in a
finding of sanity. Viewed in terms of any loss of personal freedom, the
commitment action defendant has suffered no injury and cannot, consis-
tently with the analysis used in this note, be given a cause of action. How-
ever, many courts might justifiably find it difficult to overlook another fac-
tor. It may be that a certain stigma attaches to a person who has been the
subject of even an unsuccessful commitment proceeding which could be
very damaging to a public official, an attorney, a banker, or any other per-
son who must maintain an image of responsibility. If this consideration
compels the granting of a cause of action against participants in an unsuc-
cessful judicial commitment attempt, the limits of possible liability should
be narrowly circumscribed. Recovery should be permitted only upon a
showing of actual malice on the part of the commitment participant. In
addition, only significant, demonstrable damages should be awarded.
Where, however, the original proceeding is nothing more than a form of
medical certification, no such protection should be afforded; in this type of
proceeding the allegedly insane person has no opportunity to defend him-
self by proving in court that he in fact does not need medical attention.
The requirements for protection given the participants in such proceedings
should be no different than those in a medical certification procedure which
does not require judicial approval-good faith compliance with the rele-
vant statute. If limiting the protection results in some hesitancy to use this
type of commitment procedure, this may be a necessary consequence of the
high value which our society places on individual freedom.
That some courts have not been entirely oblivious to this problem is sug-
gested by the fact that most of the cases in which the courts have seen fit to
lessen the traditional requirements of the various forms of action, or to
grant the participants in the commitment procedure only a limited protec-
tion, have involved summary type proceedings in which the allegedly insane
person had no opportunity to prove his sanity.9" However, this factor,
which should be a crucial issue in a wrongful commitment action, has often
gone unmentioned.
Another problem which results from a preoccupation with the technical-
ities of different forms of action is that this tends to obscure the basic issue
98. If the instigator has attempted to subvert the proceedings for an illegal purpose
such as the extortion of money, the state's criminal remedies seem quite sufficient.
99. Authorities cited note 95 supra.
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in any wrongful commitment action-the balancing of the desire of each
individual to be free from unwarranted interference with his personal free-
dom with the need to develop commitment procedures which will enable
those in need of mental treatment to have ready access to it. This latter
factor obviously depends on the readiness with which third parties use these
procedures, since the mentally ill for the most part cannot be expected to
seek treatment themselves."' There has been too little concern with the
issue of whether or not a particular holding will cause those who would
normally be expected to use commitment procedures-police, physicians,
public health officers-to hesitate because of the fear of personal liability.
If one has any doubt that an adverse holding in a wrongful commitment
action has an effect upon the tendency of certain professional groups to use
commitment procedures, he is simply failing to take into consideration the
lines of communication operating within such groups.'
These issues have been considered in some cases." 2 In Mezzulo,"0' the
court went to great pains to point out that it considered the need to provide
commitment procedures which would be used without fear of civil liability
to be of paramount importance. However, as a general proposition, this
question has also been almost totally ignored.
CONCLUSION
Modem commitment statutes represent an attempt to provide procedures
designed to insure that all individuals in need of mental treatment will re-
ceive it. The very real possibility that fear of civil liability will result in a
relative lack of use of these procedures presents a serious problem. Clearly,
anything short of complete protection for those involved in the commitment
of others leaves some chance of this reaction. However, the obvious oppor-
tunities for abuse in a system of absolute protection in all situations make it
totally incompatible with our traditional reverence for individual freedom.
With these issues in mind it is suggested that the dangerous insanity re-
quirement in an action growing out of a summary arrest be retained when
a private person is defending his actions. The danger to personal freedom
inherent in this situation is such that only actual immediate danger should
be acceptable as a justification. When, however, the defendant is a police-
100. Slovenko & Super, The Mentally Disabled, the Law and the Report of the
American Bar Foundation, 47 VA. L. Rzv. 1366 (1961).
101. See, e.g., Mental Health Court Digest, Aug. 1966, p. 1; Mental Health Court
Digest, June 1966, p. 6.
102. Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1954); Niven v. Boland,
177 Mass. 11, 58 N.E. 282 (1900).
103. Mezullo v. Maletz, supra note 102. For a full discussion of this case see notes
87-88 supra and accompanying text.
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man, a public health officer, or a member of the plaintiff's immediate fam-
ily or household, a reasonable belief of dangerous insanity should suffice.
The fact that the first two groups inevitably come into contact with mentally
ill persons in performing their duties underlies the relaxation of the tradi-
tional rule as to them. The family members' protection is based on their
close contact with the allegedly insane person, which makes them particu-
larly vulnerable to harm from any outburst.
Traditionally, a certifying physician is required to act in good faith and in
compliance with the relevant statute. If a physician fails to comply with
a certification statute which calls for an examination only, it seems that
liability should attach. A doctor should not commit a patient on any basis
other than first-hand knowledge. But if the statute involves a more com-
plicated and lengthy process such as the certification of two physicians, non-
compliance should be considered as no more than evidence of a lack of good
faith; the examining physician may not be able to prevent injury to the
patient or others if he takes the time to call in another doctor.
If the original commitment action was a judicial proceeding, this note
has argued that the crucial factor in determining the protection afforded
those involved in the commitment should be the character of the proceed-
ing. If the original proceeding was a full hearing in which the allegedly
insane person had the opportunity to defend himself, an individual actually
found insane should have resort to no action. Even one whose sanity was
vindicated by the commitment hearing should have only a severely limited
opportunity, if any, to bring an action. If, however, there was no opportu-
nity for self-defense, if the court simply acted as a rubber stamp, the par-
ticipants should receive no greater protection than is provided in nonjudi-
cial proceedings.
Any proposed solution will inevitably be colored by one's predispositions
in the area. For example, the man on the street undoubtedly would cringe
from any law which would allow for the possibility that he might have no
recourse against one who wrongfully commits him to a mental institution;
a police officer or physician would be equally repulsed by the thought that
they are subjecting themselves to civil liability whenever they try to have an
individual committed for his own benefit.
When such important interests as mental health and personal liberty must
be balanced, when such contradictory but legitimate views are widely held,
it is obvious that there can be no absolute solution to the problems. How-
ever, it is not too much to ask of the courts that they, in considering any
particular set of facts, recognize the central issues in these wrongful commit-
ment actions and base their decisions on these factors alone.
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